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Post-ISIL reconciliation in Iraq and the local anatomy of 
national grievances: the case of Yathrib
Jessica Watkins and Mustafa Hasan
Middle East Centre, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK
ABSTRACT
The incentive for international agencies to promote ‘local’ peace-
building is commonly premised on the hope that micro-level 
interventions can nourish grassroots activism and participatory 
citizenship. Tracing reconciliation processes across Iraq following 
the defeat of ISIL provides a window through which to view the 
transactional relationships between ‘national’ and ‘local’ forms of 
politics, conflict and peace in post-Ba’athist Iraq. This paper 
focuses on the example of Yathrib, Salah al-Din province, where 
over ninety per cent of residents were displaced in 2014, and an 
estimated eighty-five per cent subsequently returned following 
peace negotiations. The paper uses qualitative interview findings 
to demonstrate on the one hand that seemingly ‘local’ tribal 
solutions are built into national-level ‘peace strategies’, while on 
the other, state capture and power politics is infused into the 
management of apparently parochial disputes. While these obser-
vations are not an indictment of international efforts to intervene 
at the subnational level, they serve to thoroughly ‘de-romanticise’ 
the local.
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The ‘local turn’ to peacebuilding has undergone several theoretical and policy-oriented 
shifts since rising to prominence nearly thirty years ago.1 In a 2015 critical review of the 
trend, Paffenholz identifies two ‘waves’ of scholarship advocating increased emphasis on 
the ‘local’.2 Both emphasise that peace cannot be simply imposed on conflict-wrought 
states by external actors, but differ in other respects. The first, following Lederech’s work 
after the Cold War, broadly conceived the ‘local’ as actors at the middle level of society 
(such as NGOs and ‘community’ leaders) who could influence both national and grass-
roots levels, and were therefore deserving of capacity-building assistance from interna-
tional development agencies.3 The second, represented by the work of Mac Ginty and 
CONTACT Jessica Watkins Jessica.Watkins@giga-hamburg.de
Present affiliation for Jessica Watkins is German Institute for Global and Area Studies (GIGA).
1See Leonardsson, Hanna, and Gustav Rudd, ‘The “local turn” in peacebuilding: a literature review of effective and 
emancipatory local peacebuilding’, Third world quarterly 36, no. 5 (2015): 825–839.
2Thania Paffenholz, ‘Unpacking the local turn in peacebuilding: a critical assessment towards an agenda for future 
research’, Third world quarterly 36, no. 5 (2015): 857–874.
3John Paul Lederach, Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies (Washington, DC: United States 
Institute of Peace Press, 1997).
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Richmond, emerged as a critical reaction to the failure of wholesale liberal statebuilding 
in Afghanistan and Iraq in the early 2000s.4 These scholars problematised the interna-
tional application of liberal peace projects, and instead promoted ‘a post-liberal order 
founded on emancipatory local agency’.5 In this latter context, the ‘local’ was often simply 
treated as pertaining to the domestic as opposed to the international, whether at the 
national, provincial, or district level. For her part, Paffenholz criticises the second wave’s 
tendency to understand international and domestic peacebuilding initiatives as binary 
opposites (i.e. liberal versus local), with little regard for the fact that international 
interventions are not monolithically ‘liberal’, and that ‘local’ actors do not uniformly 
share an agenda for promoting their citizens’ welfare. She also questions the assumption 
that local actors will resist liberal international interventions, citing examples of domestic 
actors at the mid-level of society resisting predatory elites which have captured the state 
at the centre.6
Although the failure of the international statebuilding project in Iraq post-2003 
shaped the second wave of local peacebuilding scholarship, surprisingly little academic 
attention has subsequently been paid to efforts promoting local peacebuilding in Iraq. In 
the contemporary Iraqi context, ‘local’ is commonly used interchangeably with ‘subna-
tional’ to apply to processes at provincial, municipal, and district levels. What matters for 
prospective peacebuilders is not so much the unit of analysis, as the possibility that 
peacebuilding at whatever subnational level could be driven by different logics to those at 
the centre, and thereby provide intervening agencies with outlets to promote participa-
tory citizenship and grassroots agency. Such hopes generated initial optimism for efforts 
to decentralise Iraq’s provinces as a means of lessening conflict.7 In practice, decentra-
lisation has focused on administrative measures, with few political or revenue-raising 
powers granted to local governments. Lack of formally ceded autonomy impacts the 
ability of these ‘middle’ level government officials to shape how peace takes effect in their 
constituencies, but it has not rendered them inactive. As will be seen, provincial and sub- 
provincial political actors operate within ‘local’ transactional political fields, which often 
overlap with, as opposed to merely being subsidiary to, politics at the centre, but do not 
present a fundamentally different logic of governance. With respect to local peacebuild-
ing, externally backed development actors must be able to at least navigate underlying 
domestic logics if they are to help implement settlements.
The story of government in post-Ba’athist Iraq, at both the centre and peripheries, is 
one of progressive state capture. While technically based on competitive elections, Iraq’s 
political settlement is a product of ‘de-Baathifcation’ policies endorsed by the Coalition 
Provisional Authority in 2003, and an allocative system, or ‘muhasasa’, whereby minis-
tries, state-owned enterprises, political posts and public sector jobs are divided amongst 
dominant political parties and their followers.8 While patronage politics was widespread 
4e.g. Roger Mac Ginty and Oliver Richmond, ‘The Local Turn in Peacebuilding: A Critical Agenda for Peace’, Third World 
Quarterly 34, no. 5 (2013): 763–783.
5Oliver Richmond, A Post-liberal Peace (Abingdon: Routledge, 2011).
6Paffenholz, ‘Unpacking the local turn’, 858–860.
7See, for example, Joseph Siegle and Patrick O’Mahony, ‘Decentralization and Internal Conflict,’ in Making Decentralisation 
Work: Democracy, Development, and Security, ed. Ed Connerley, Kenton Eaton, Paul Smoke (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 
2010): 135–166. Derick Brinkerhoff and Ronald Johnson, ‘Decentralized local governance in fragile states: Learning from 
Iraq’, International Review of Administrative Sciences 75, no. 4 (2009): 585–607.
8See Toby Dodge and Renad Mansour, ‘Sectarianization and De-sectarianization in the Struggle for Iraq’s Political Field,’ 
The Review of Faith & International Affairs 18, no. 1 (2020): 58–69.
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under Saddam, the Coalition embedded a consociational division of power, consolidating 
patronage networks along sectarian lines, and establishing the Shi’a (roughly 65% of the 
population) as dominant within them.9 Over time, while hostilities related to sect have 
persisted, allegiances based on sect have fractured, and multiple political factions, most of 
which enjoy pockets of subnational influence, have competed for a ‘slice of the pie’.
The exclusion from federal government felt within Sunni-Arab majority provinces is 
perceived as a key factor in the rise of Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) from 
2014, even if more ‘parochial’ pre-existing and largely non-sectarian disputes contributed 
to some supporting ISIL. In the course of ISIL’s occupation and the subsequent ‘libera-
tion’ campaign, around 6 million Iraqis were displaced from across central and north-
western Iraq. Many faced enormous challenges in returning, including the seizure of 
their property by ‘liberating forces’ (a combination of Iraqi government security forces, 
Kurdish Peshmerga, and volunteer forces organised around tribal and ethno-sectarian 
identities), death threats from the remaining population over suspected ISIL sympathies, 
or exorbitant demands for blood money payment to families of ISIL victims. In this 
context, various religious and tribal figures, municipal, provincial and national politi-
cians, federal government representatives, formal and informal security actors, and 
external agencies have intervened to support dozens of lengthy reconciliation processes 
between hostile families to enable the displaced to return.
This paper looks at one such reconciliation process, pertaining to Yathrib in Salah al- 
Din province, a mixed Sunni-Shi’a community in the Sunni-Arab heartland, where over 
80,000 residents were displaced between June and November 2014. Using findings from 
a series of qualitative interviews with key stakeholders in the negotiations as well as 
protagonists and bystanders from different sides of the dispute, the paper seeks to 
understand how ‘peace’ was manipulated by actors and issues that intersected multiple 
layers of governance, and how this necessarily framed the parameters of intervention by 
externally funded peacebuilding agencies. While the dynamics of reconciliation processes 
elsewhere in Iraq, including Qaim in Anbar, Tikrit in Salah al-Din, and Telafar in Ninewa 
may produce equally valuable insights about peacebuilding in divided communities, here, 
we focus on Yathrib because the findings we accumulated clearly demonstrate how the 
multi-scalar tribal and transactional politics which permeates post-Ba’athist Iraq affected 
peacebuilding in the district.10
The article’s findings are based on semi-structured qualitative interviews by the 
authors with 19 individuals based in Iraq, including 11 residents of Yathrib and the 
surrounding region in Salah al-Din, former employees of Sanad (an Iraqi NGO specialis-
ing in conflict resolution established in 2013 by the United States Institute for Peace – 
USIP) and Sanad’s Network of Iraqi Facilitators (NIF), members of the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP), and a former advisor to the Iraqi government on 
reconciliation. The interviews were conducted between September 2019 and 
February 2020. While some interviews were conducted in person by one of the authors, 
9In 2018, Transparency International ranked Iraq 169 out of 180 countries in terms of corruption.
10Overall, more international attention has been given to local reconciliation processes in the ethnically diverse Ninewa 
province, possibly in part because of donor interest in minority rights, and in part because Ninewa is relatively more 
accessible to donor agencies operating from the Iraqi Kurdish Region than other parts of the country. For an analysis of 
a parallel reconciliation process that occurred in Ninewa, see Sarah Sanbar, Barriers to post-ISIS reconciliation in Iraq: 
Case study of Tel Afar, Ninewa (Sciences Po, Kuwait Programme, 2021). https://www.sciencespo.fr/kuwait-program/wp- 
content/uploads/2021/02/Sarah-Sanbar-Post-ISIS-Reconciliation-in-Iraq.pdf.
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due to the prevailing security situation in the area and in Iraq more generally at the time 
of research, over half of the interviews were conducted remotely. We also had recourse to 
a collection of secondary Arabic language news articles and television bulletins retrieved 
via YouTube.
The paper is divided into five sections. The first situates ‘reconciliation’ at national and 
subnational levels as a form of transitional justice in post-conflict societies in general, and 
in post-2003 Iraq in particular. The following two sections address events in Yathrib: part 
two focuses on the period between June 2014, when ISIL took control of the district, and 
December 2014, when Iraqi ground forces and international air forces defeated militants 
in Yathrib. Part three outlines the respective roles played by local, national and interna-
tional actors in the messy process of brokering reconciliation between 2014 and 2019, 
demonstrating the extent to which Sanad’s efforts were bound up with those of more self- 
seeking political actors. Part four questions assumptions about the inclusiveness of ‘local’ 
peacebuilding by highlighting the ambiguous divisions between different layers of gov-
ernance, and the frequently exclusionary nature of tribal and transactional politics 
combined which influenced the shape of peace. The concluding part reflects on how 
Yathrib informs the debate on national versus subnational forms of peacebuilding, and 
the role played by external donor agencies. Ultimately, the authors reserve judgment on 
the inherent value of international actors supporting specific local peacebuilding initia-
tives but highlight considerations worth factoring into calculations about the potential 
benefits of intervention.
2. Post-conflict reconciliation and its particularities in post-ISIL Iraq
The need to restore conditions for sustainable intercommunal peace, if not harmony, 
through ‘reconciliation’, has been formally recognised in post-conflict states including 
South Africa, Sierra Leonne, Argentina, Haiti and Iraq as a key component of transitional 
justice. The UN defines transitional justice as ‘the full range of processes and mechanisms 
associated with a society’s attempt to come to terms with a legacy of large-scale past 
abuses, in order to ensure accountability, serve justice and achieve reconciliation’.11 As 
such, it has included a combination of judicial and non-judicial proceedings including 
truth-telling commissions, reparations, prosecution, and institutional reform.
Clearly, the circumstances under which conflicts end influence the characteristics of 
reconciliation. Where a clear victor emerges, there is often a tendency to impose 
retributive forms of justice (punishing offenders), whereas negotiated peace provides 
greater potential, and indeed pressure, for restorative justice (restoring relationships 
between offenders and victims). Inevitably, transitional justice initiatives can be highly 
asymmetric. Writing about the recent Syrian civil war, Sosnowski argues that the regime 
has used local truces termed reconciliation agreements as ‘tools of subjugation and 
control’ akin to ‘strangle’ contracts since they leave the weaker party with little choice 
about the outcome.12 By branding these arrangements ‘reconciliation’, she argues, the 
regime seeks to derive international legitimacy.
11United Nations Security Council, ‘The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-conflict Societies, S/2004/ 
616*,’ 23 August 2004, paragraph 8.
12Marika Sosnowski, ‘Reconciliation agreements as strangle contracts: ramifications for property and citizenship rights in 
the Syrian civil war,” Peacebuilding (2019): 1–16.
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Since severe internal conflict almost invariably entails mass displacement, post-conflict 
peacebuilding and reconciliation is often concerned at least partially with resettlement.13 
The degree to which refugees and/or internally displaced individuals are given a voice in 
post-conflict negotiations has varied, generally in accordance with the relationship between 
the displaced and ruling elite, but is overall low.14 Conflicts which have become national in 
scale are often bound up with ‘localised’ grievances, which, to address the particular needs 
of the constituencies in question, arguably require reconciliation processes which are 
distinct from national-level political settlements.15 Support from Western development 
agencies to reconciliation processes has been predominantly accorded at the national level, 
or via the delivery of training in conflict-resolution skills to community actors.16 In post- 
ISIL Iraq, however, Sanad actually intervened into specific local dispute-resolution pro-
cesses, providing important case-study material for those interested in how externally- 
supported local peacebuilding plays out in practice.
National reconciliation has been a recurrent theme on Iraq’s political agenda since 2003. 
Premised initially on the need to grant justice to the thousands of victims of Saddam’s 
regime, the meaning of ‘reconciliation’ has subsequently evolved, reflecting the need to 
make amends for wrongs committed during sustained bouts of sectarian warfare in mixed 
Sunni-Shi’a communities in Iraq and the emergence of Sunni-Arab militant insurgencies. 
Many conflicts premised on sectarian or ethno-sectarian grievances have ‘tribal’ under-
tones, and reconciliation processes commonly follow tribal customary models. In Arab 
tribal societies, ‘reconciliation’ (musalaha) is a key component of customary law that 
regulates relations between disputing parties. When blood is shed as a result of conflict 
between two or more individuals, families, or tribes, the family of the offending party must 
offer to pay compensation or diya (a Quranic term for blood money) to the family of the 
victim, as well as satisfying other terms to ensure that the victim’s family or tribe will not 
seek revenge. While civil laws (and in some cases shari’a) have formally replaced tribal laws 
across the Middle East, customary laws pertaining to dispute resolution are still widely 
observed.17 This is particularly the case in less urbanised and conflict-prone settings, where 
the civil legal system has no teeth. In Iraq, tribal dispute resolution processes have 
frequently filled the vacuum left by the state’s inability to enforce civil law and order and 
were commonly pursued in the years of heightened sectarian violence between 2005 and 
2008, and after ISIL’s defeat.18
During ISIL’s campaign across central and northern Iraq between 2014 and 2017, ISIL 
militants killed tens of thousands of Iraqi security personnel as well as civilians, targeting 
13Jacqueline Maria Klopp, Patrick Githinji, and Keffa Karuoya, Internal displacement and local peacebuilding in Kenya (US 
Institute of Peace, 2010).
14Khalid Koser, ‘Introduction: Integrating Displacement in Peace Processes and Peacebuilding,’ Refugee survey quarterly 
28, no. 1 (2009): 5–12.
15E.g. Mneesha Gellma, ‘No justice, no peace? National reconciliation and local conflict resolution in Cambodia’, Asian 
Perspective (2008): 37–57. Ken Menkhaus, ‘International peacebuilding and the dynamics of local and national 
reconciliation in Somalia’, International Peacekeeping 3, no. 1 (1996): 42–67.
16In fact, analysis of international support for youth civil society initiatives in the Bosnia and Herzigovina suggested that 
NGO agendas actually sometimes had the effect of inhibiting organic local reconciliation processes. See Nicholas 
Micinski, ‘NGO frequent flyers: Youth organisations and the undermining of reconciliation in Bosnia and Herzegovina’, 
Journal of Peacebuilding & Development 11, no. 1 (2016): 99–104.
17See Jessica Watkins, ‘Seeking Justice: Tribal dispute resolution and societal transformation in Jordan’, International 
Journal of Middle East Studies 46, no. 1 (2014): 31–49, with reference to Jordan.
18Katherine Blue Carroll, ‘Tribal Law and reconciliation in the new Iraq’, The Middle East Journal 65, no. 1 (2011): 11–29; 
Haley Bobseine, ‘Tribal Justice in a Fragile Iraq’ (Century Foundation, 7 November 2019).
PEACEBUILDING 5
Shi’a and other minorities, but also Sunni-Arabs whom they identified as apostates. ISIL 
achieved easy victories over the Iraqi army and police in many areas. Security forces were 
unable to defeat the militants until mid-2017, assisted by international air strikes and the 
Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF). The majority of the PMF hail from Shi’a-majority 
provinces, and a number are backed by Iran.
The Iraqi government’s position towards ISIL after its defeat was unequivocal. 
Members were declared terrorists and those captured sentenced to death. ISIL family 
members were also treated harshly: many were forcibly detained in camps, and only freed 
if they publicly denounced relatives and cooperated with the authorities in identifying 
other members. The question of how to deal with suspected ISIL sympathisers, however, 
has been more complex. During the ISIL campaign and counter-campaign, an estimated 
six million Iraqis (15 per cent of the entire population) were displaced.19 They included 
Shi’a Arabs, Kurds, Christians, Shabak, Yezidis and Turkman; but the majority were 
Sunni-Arabs. Some fled to escape ISIL; others, who for various reasons remained under 
ISIL rule, fled during the ‘liberation’, fearing damage to their possessions and/or sectarian 
reprisals from Iraqi security forces and PMF.
The security landscape in ‘liberated’ Iraq has changed dramatically. In many areas, the 
PMF and their political allies retain de facto control over local security. The PMF were 
formally incorporated as an independent unit into the state security forces by the Iraqi 
parliament in November 2016.20 Nevertheless, a number of units, particularly those loyal 
to Iran, act largely autonomously, and have ignored government directives to withdraw 
from urban areas. The newly acquired political clout of these organisations (the Fatah 
alliance, which incorporates leaders of the key ‘pro-Iran’ components of the PMF won 
over 14% of the vote in the 2018 parliamentary elections) has enabled them to play 
instrumental intermediary roles in brokering agreements concerning the conditions 
under which displaced families can return. The following sections consider how this 
process played out in Yathrib.
3. ISIL’s campaign and the counter-campaign on Yathrib
Yathrib is a small district in Balad municipality in the south of Salah al-Din, 100km from 
Baghdad. The district covers approximately 4.5 square kilometres and according to the 
central directorate for statistics in Salah al-Din, 2019, has a population of around 83,151. 
The land is highly fertile with an abundant water supply from the Dijla River to the north 
and east. To the west is Balad town, to the south is Dujail district. Yathrib is close to Balad 
air base, as well as the Imam Al-Assiyd Muhammad bin Ali Al-Hadi Shi’a shrine, which 
was stormed in July 2016 by ISIL militants.
Most residents are cultivators who farm dates, citrus orchards and grapes. An inten-
sely tribal character has prevailed in the area, and strong allegiances are paid to rural 
traditions. The tribesmen hail from the Bani Tamim, Zubayd Albu Sultan, al-Izza, Bani 
Assad, al-‘Aaniyyin of the al-Ubayd tribal confederation, and the Bani Sa’ad. The Bani 
19International Organisation for Migration, ‘Iraq Displacement Figures Drop Below Two Million for First Time Since 2014; Nearly 
Four Million Have Returned Home’, September4, 2015. https://reliefweb.int/report/iraq/iraq-displacement-figures-drop- 
below-two-million-first-time-2014-nearly-four-million (accessed July 10, 2020).
20Full text of the law available in Arabic as of 23 May 2021 on al-Sumarianews webpage: https://www.alsumaria.tv/news/ 
187029/- يبعشلا-دشحلا-صن-رشنت-زوين-ةيراموسلا
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Tamim comprise the largest tribes in the area: prior to ISIL’s campaign, around 40,000 
Bani Tamim lived in ‘Albu-Hashma settlement in Yathrib; 7,000 (known as the 
Albufadus) in Hatemiya; and roughly 5,000 in Albu Hassan settlement. Around 12,000 
Zubayd Albu Sultan lived in al-Mazari’a settlement; 19,000 al-‘Izza in Albu Jayli settle-
ment; 10,000 Bani Assad in Ahbab village; 9,000 Al-‘Aniyyin in the Hadera village; 7,000 
Bani Saad in ‘Al-Saoud’ settlement; and 5,000 Karaghul in a settlement south of 
Yathrib.21 While Yathrib (and indeed Salah al-Din more generally) is predominantly 
Sunni-Arab, the Bani Sa’ad, Albufadus Hatemiya, and some Albu Hassan are Shi’a, as are 
several of the tribes in neighbouring Balad town.22
Since 2003, Salah Al-Din has been repeatedly identified by the Iraqi government as 
a source of Sunni Islamist militancy. It is situated within the so-called ‘Sunni Triangle’ 
northwest of Baghdad. Tikrit forms the northern tip of the triangle, Ramadi and Baghdad 
form the southwestern and southeastern points. After the 2003 US-led occupation of 
Iraq, much of the Sunni militant opposition to coalition forces and the new 
Shi’a-dominated government emanated from this area. Balad municipality itself was 
a source of recruits for Al-Qa’ida, the ‘Army of the Men of the Naqshbandiya Order’ 
and Ansar al-Sunna.23
On 11 June 2014, the local police in Yathrib surrendered unexpectedly to a small 
convoy of ISIL militants entering from the north and east of the province. A few hours 
later, the army units protecting the perimeter withdrew, mostly to Balad airbase. On the 
same day, ISIL militants seized control over all Yathrib’s settlements barring the pre-
dominantly Shi’a Bani Sa’ad, Albufadus Hatemiya and Albu-Hassan settlements, where 
tribesmen resisted. According to informed local sources interviewed by the authors, the 
number of fatalities was in the hundreds, whilst thousands were injured.
In Yathrib’s centre and surrounding settlements where ISIL militants took control, 
they forced residents, civil servants and members of the security forces to declare 
allegiance to their self-proclaimed Caliph, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, and to disavow the 
Iraqi state. They then introduced a range of restrictions on residents, including shutting 
hairdressers (which they proclaimed immoral), forbidding smoking and internet use, 
seizing and destroying satellite dishes, demanding regular mosque attendance, imposing 
conservative dress codes, and prohibiting women from going out except when accom-
panied by male family members. Villagers reported that those who disobeyed received 
punishments, which in their most extreme form included stoning to death. Young men 
were obliged to join the militants and to execute those who refused in public squares.24 
Some tribesmen, including members of the Albu-Jayli, Al-Mazari’a and al-Aaniyyin 
became ISIL leaders. Many Albu Hashma, alienated by what they viewed as the anti- 
Sunni-Arab policies of the Maliki government, also swore allegiance to ISIL.25
Many residents fled, heading to other parts of Salah al-Din, Diyala, Kirkuk or 
Suleymaniya. Some left Iraq entirely and sought refuge in Turkey. Others subsequently 
attempted to flee, telling ISIL members manning checkpoints that they were going to 
hospital or to visit relatives. They promised to return within a set period, or else their 
21Interview with former Yathrib resident, 21 January 2020.
22Demographic details were compiled via interviews with current and former residents of Yathrib and Balad.
23Interview with Balad resident, 17 November 2019.
24Interview with Iraqi journalist covering Yathrib, 29 December 2019.
25Interview with Balad resident, 17 December 2019.
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houses would be seized. But ISIL subsequently forbade residents from leaving altogether, 
executed those who tried to flee in the town centre, and blew up the homes of alleged 
‘apostates’.26
The tribes resisting ISIL appealed to Iraqi forces and PMFs to assist in the campaign to 
liberate the district. In late 2014, the Iraqi air force began extensive strikes on Yathrib, 
targeting ISIL assets and forcing the vast majority of the population to flee. In late 
December, Iraqi security forces announced a campaign to liberate Yathrib, involving 
17 Division of the Iraqi Army, Federal Police, and PMFs – specifically Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq 
(AAH), Kata’ib Hizbullah, Badr, the Imam Abbas Combat Division, and the Hussayniya 
Threshold Brigades (which are all associated with Iranian backing). The Iraqi army, air 
force and coalition forces provided air support. ISIL militants used around 13 thousand 
residents as human shields, but were nonetheless defeated and the Iraqi flag was raised 
above the district building on 27/12/2014. The security file was handed over to Brigade 
41 pertaining to AAH.27
Land and property in Yathrib were extensively damaged by ISIL and the ‘liberation’ 
campaign. An official source in the area indicated that over 70% of the houses were blown 
up and most agricultural plains were damaged by fires and disruptions to water supplies. 
Thousands of cars were abandoned in fields by fleeing families, and many destroyed in 
subsequent fighting. Following ISIL’s defeat, mass graves containing bodies of residents 
executed by militants were discovered in the orchards.28
4. Peace-brokers and the long road to reconciliation
Mass displacement across Iraq during ISIL’s campaign presented the federal and pro-
vincial governments with staggering humanitarian responsibilities. The authorities, while 
intent on dispensing justice to ISIL members, were also keen for the displaced to return 
home as soon as possible. In Yathrib, however, where over 90% of the pre-2014 popula-
tion had fled, Shi’a tribal shaikhs, as well as Sunni-Arab tribal leaders in Dujail and Balad 
whose tribesmen had been killed resisting ISIL, refused to allow thousands of families to 
return home, claiming that they or their relatives had collaborated with ISIL. Some 
families did attempt to return and were warned that they would be subject to tribal 
revenge attacks if they did not leave.
Over the following five years, efforts by USIP, Sanad, the NIF and the UNDP to return 
the displaced to their homes were intermingled with other initiatives sponsored by 
a combination of municipal, provincial and national figures. Amongst the high-profile 
figures who attempted to broker or impose solutions were Salim al-Jabouri, former 
Speaker of the Council of Representatives; Qassim Daraji, Baghdad member of parlia-
ment for al-Sadiqun, the political wing of AAH; Ra’id al-Jabouri, and subsequently his 
cousin Ahmed al-Jabouri, the governors of Salah al-Din along with other members of the 
provincial council; Abdullatif al-Humaym, Chairman of the Sunni Endowments Fund; 
and Abu Ali al-Saadi, the central and northern regional military commander of AAH. 
Other security commanders also chipped in, as did tribal leaders in the district who had 
26Interview with Yathrib resident, 8 November 2019.
27Interview with journalist covering Yathrib, 29 December 2020.
28see note 23 above.
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previously worked with the prime minister’s office on the reconciliation file since the days 
of Al-Qae’da.29
The overall reconciliation strategy was to broker agreements at the level of the tribe or 
sub-tribe between resident and displaced tribesmen (known as the ‘resisting’ and ‘return-
ing’ tribes). In practice, these tribes were not unified: indeed, the Bani Tamim were split 
between resisting and returning tribes. Initial attempts to achieve all-encompassing agree-
ments faltered, not least because some of the would-be ‘brokers’ were not viewed as neutral 
by all parties. In the summer of 2015, some tribesmen agreed on the behind-the-scenes 
intervention of Sanad and its Network of Iraqi Facilitators (NIF). Sanad had achieved 
notable success in easing tensions between tribes after the Camp Speicher massacre in 
June 2014, when ISIL militants murdered an estimated 1700 army recruits.30Sanad’s 
approach involved analysing the underlying causes of conflict, identifying enablers and 
spoilers, and engaging various factions (including displaced tribesmen in Suleymaniya and 
elsewhere) to identify their claims and demands before bringing the parties together.31 
A Sanad facilitator emphasised that in all of their work, they sought to bring in as many 
perspectives as possible, including those of women, noting that women often highlighted 
practical aspects necessary for coexistince (for instance, relating to ration cards), which men 
might not.
Sanad’s initial efforts were cut short when donor funding ran out after six months, at 
which point several of the more influential PMF in the province took the reins, using 
their own intermediaries to exhort both resisting and returning tribes to compromise on 
the terms of return, but without conclusive results. When Sanad’s activities resumed with 
new funding some months later, they were able to establish several preliminary agree-
ments-in-principle with disputing parties, including the agreement that families of ISIL 
victims, rather than receiving ‘blood money’ from the returning tribes, might instead be 
paid by Iraqi government’s official compensation fund.
These tentative agreements provided the framework for a large conference in Baghdad 
in May 2016, hosted by the Chairman of the Sunni Endowments Council, the provincial 
governor and provincial council chairman. The conference was attended by representa-
tives of various (though not all) parties to the dispute, who signed a ‘Community Peace 
Document’,32 committing themselves, and, by extension, their tribes, to a range of 
clauses. The onus of responsibility naturally fell on the ‘returning’ tribes, who agreed 
to publicly denounce tribesmen who had joined or cooperated with ISIL; to never allow 
ISIL members, their fathers, sons or brothers to return; to ‘reveal the fate of tribesmen 
whom Daesh [ISIL] had kidnapped’, and likewise to reveal where the bodies of martyrs 
had been buried and to treat anyone concealing this information as a participant in the 
crime; to refrain from initiating malicious lawsuits related to the bombing of houses and 
theft of property; and to comply with the authorities’ security checks enabling their 
return. The resisting tribes agreed not to close the main road in the area or the roads 
leading to it; to stop operating illegal checkpoints and preventing tribesemen who had 
29Interview with tribal Shaykh in Balad district, 8 December 2020.
30See Sanad for Peacebuilding, ‘Speicher Conflict Resolution’, November 2015.
31Assorted interviews, November–February 2020.
32The authors obtained an electronic copy of the agreement. For more details, see ‘Al-Hamaym Yar’aa Tawqi’a Itifaqiya 
Wathiqat Sharf Bayn Asha’ir Nahiyat Yathrib wa-l-Manatiq al-Majawar laha’ report by Ahmed al-Mahmud, Dewan Channel, 
11 May 2016. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v = FEd_QTRTDfY (accessed July 22, 2020); or https://www.facebook.com/ 
Dr.Ahmed.Abdullah.al.Jubouri/photos/pcb.1682655711983272/1682655448649965 (accessed May 23, 2021).
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complied with legal procedures from returning. All sides agreed to form a tribal council 
in Yathrib to preserve ‘good neighbourliness’ and resolve tribal disputes. Salah al-Din 
provincial government agreed to ask the Supreme Judicial Council to expedite relevant 
lawsuits and to establish a popular mobilisation battalion composed of residents, who 
were to preserve security alongside the army and local police.33
Additional financial, administrative and security conditions were added during the 
conference, including the requirement that victims’ families be paid the equivalent of 
blood money in form of 500,000 dinars on family ration cards. The matter of compensa-
tion was not, however, settled, and as a result, the agreement was not fully 
implemented.34 Both the Salah al-Din governor and Sunni Endowments chairman 
offered to contribute large sums as compensation. However, several resisting tribes 
insisted that returning tribes must pay blood money (even where the latter denied 
cooperating with ISIL), which they were not always able or willing to do.
Some families were permitted to return, after paying diya, or offering assurances that 
the governorate would pay compensation on their behalf. The returnees underwent 
arduous security checks by local authorities in tents outside Yathrib before being finally 
admitted, and those whose houses had been destroyed had to live in tents provided by the 
UN and provincial government.35 But for the majority, negotiations stumbled on over 
the subsequent months and years. Individual agreements were gradually concluded 
between different tribal subgroups concerning payment of compensation, with various 
actors playing more-or-less prominent roles in mediation.
From early 2017, the UNDP, under the rubric of its Integrated Reconciliation 
Programme, assigned Sanad with forming a 30-member local peace committee for 
Dujail and Balad comprising tribal leaders, activists, youth representatives and local 
government officials including the district mayor. Some committee members were 
already involved in mediating between tribes and dealt primarily with promoting recon-
ciliation between clans – not only from Yathrib but also from other nearby tribes affected 
by ISIL. Sanad trained committee members in conflict resolution and negotiating. In 
February 2018, Sanad and the UNDP hosted a press conference in which around 40 
community leaders around Balad and Dujail announced their support for principles of 
peaceful co-existence and stabilisation in Yathrib, which included supporting security 
agencies and the rule of law, supporting victims and preventing retaliation and collective 
punishments.36
By early 2019, an estimated 45,000 of the displaced had returned. In March, in another 
tribal conference hosted by the governor (who by then was Ammar al-Jabar al-Jabouri), 
the Albufadus finally agreed to allow a further 30,000 of the Albu Hashma to return, 
pending payment of diya.37 In early 2020, Salah al-Din’s UNDP coordinator told the 
authors that thanks to the committee’s efforts, around 80% of the displaced had even-
tually been able to return.38
38Interview with UNDP regional coordinator 8 January 2020.
33These details are stated in the agreement. See also: ‘Al-Doctor al-Hamaym yaqra’a fuqrat wathiqat al-Sharf bayn Asha’ir 
Nahiya Yathrib’, Sunni Endowments Council webpage. www.sunniaffairs.gov.iq/ar (accessed July 18, 2020).
34Interview with UNDP representative for Salah al-Din, 19 January 2020.
35Interview with a returnee, 8 November 2020.
36Sanad for Peacebuilding, ‘Press Release Announcement of Peaceful Coexistence and Stabilization Agreement in 
Yathrib’, February 2018.
37‘Ba’ad musalaha wa diyat ‘asha’iriya, Salah al-Din taqtarib men ighlaq molif Nazihi Yathrib’, al-Kham News, March31, 2019. 
https://khamnews.com/story/16325/- ت-نيدلا-حالص-ةيرئاشع-تايد-و-ةحلاصم-دعب
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5. Assessing inclusiveness amidst tribal and transactional politics
The return of the majority of Yathrib’s residents was an achievement: elsewhere in Iraq, 
including parts of Ninawa, displacement figures remain far higher. But at what cost did it 
occur? While Sanad and the UNDP sought to promote the type of inclusiveness and 
participatory citizenship that international actors commonly associate with ‘the local’, 
a closer examination of the dynamics of the peace process indicates that, to the extent 
that it was a ‘local’ process, it was not particularly equitable, and was strongly influenced 
by the logic of tribal and transactional politics which permeate Iraq as a whole, and which 
are far from inclusive.
Yathrib’s reconciliation process was ‘local’ in that it pertained to a particular subnational 
administrative territory, but the actors involved and issues at stake intersected different 
spheres of district/municipal/provincial/national and even international government and 
governance. Our interviewees in Balad municipality indicated that the terms of reconcilia-
tion were affected by the way that pre-existing tensions within the district, particularly 
within the Bani Tamim interacted with national dynamics. Until ISIL’s takeover, the Albu 
Hashma had dominated local political affairs, including positions on the local council. With 
the rise of the Shi’a-dominated federal government post-2003, some Shi’a members of the 
much smaller Albu Hassan sought greater influence over local affairs, and after ISIL’s 
invasion, sought PMF assistance to liberate Yathrib. After ISIL’s defeat, AAH in particular 
gained a decisive role in local politics. The former council chairman (an Albu Hashma) was 
expelled and accused of supporting terrorism, and the governor’s office in Yathrib 
appointed one of the Albu Hassan as the (first Shi’a) chair of the council, although the 
Albu Hashma retained the directorship of the district council.39 At the same time, inter-
viewees in Balad indicated that part of the reason why some tribes were so vehemently 
opposed to the return of others was because in their absence, they had profited from the use 
of their lands.
The widespread pursuit of tribal dispute resolution in ISIL’s aftermath is unsurprising 
given that many ISIL members were recruited through patrilineal kinship networks. But 
contrary to the idea that ‘tribal’ solutions are fundamentally parochial or ‘local’, they have been 
incorporated into national peace strategies. This is not merely a product of the post-2003 
settlement. During the early years of Saddam’s rule, the Baath regime suppressed the 
prerogative of tribal leaders to autonomously settle disputes along customary lines.40 
However, over time Saddam reactivated aspects of tribalism as a strategy of governance, 
sometimes giving precedence to tribal law above the civil legal system.41 Following regime 
change, the 2005 Iraqi Constitution enshrined ‘the advancement of the Iraqi clans and tribes’ 
and ‘their noble human values in a way that contributes to the development of society’. But it 
also noted that: ‘The State shall prohibit tribal traditions that are in contradiction with human 
rights’.42 The Iraqi government has further upheld tribal identity by creating tribal affairs 
committees to operate in the Prime Minister’s Office, the Ministry of Interior and in parlia-
ment, and the Ministry of Justice has established formal communications with tribal shaikhs 
39Interviews with Balad and former Yathrib residents, November and December 2019.
40Yaphe, Judith, ‘Tribalism in Iraq, the old and the new’, Middle East Policy 7, no. 3 (2000): 51.
41Baram, Amatzia, ‘Neo-tribalism in Iraq: Saddam Hussein’s tribal policies 1991–96’, International Journal of Middle East 
Studies 29, no. 1 (1997): 1–31: 14.
42See: https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Iraq_2005.pdf?lang=en (accessed May 2, 2020).
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across the country. The National Office for Reconciliation, created under former Iraqi PM 
Nouri al-Maliki’s rule, frequently intervened in tribal affairs.43
In Yathrib, district, provincial, national and occasionally international actors played 
a part in brokering tribal reconciliations, showing varying levels of commitment to 
ensuring that Iraqi civil law, and individuals’ rights, were preserved. Certain customary 
practices of collective punishment (such as jalwa, whereby a wrongdoer’s relatives up to 
the 4th or 5th degree of patrilineal descent are exiled from their hometown), are clearly 
difficult to reconcile with principles of participatory citizenship. In 2016, Salah al-Din 
provincial council adapted jalwa to civil law, passing a resolution stating that ‘anyone 
proven to have been complicit or affiliated with ISIL has no right to return to the 
governorate’, and ordering the expulsion of immediate relatives of ISIL-members from 
Salah al-Din for 10 years to life, noting that they were only allowed to return if deemed 
‘safe.”44 The decree also established a committee to seize ISIL-affiliates’ property and 
suspend their ration cards, and those of their families. Families that killed ISIL-affiliated 
relatives or handed them to the authorities were exempted.
Sanad sought to soften some of the more exclusionary aspects common to tribal 
customary practices, for instance by including women in peace negotiations behind the 
scenes, but a member of the NIF acknowledged that in reality women had no place at the 
table in tribal musalahat.45 The UNDP-sponsored local peace committee for Balad and 
Dujail also appointed a few women, but according to a male member, they were unable to 
play a particularly active role in the reconciliation file. Similarly, Sanad encouraged 
resisting tribes to accept government compensation funds in place of diya from returning 
tribes. This initiative was only partially successful; however, intermediaries at several 
levels exploited the collection of diya for political ends, and the distribution of compen-
sation funds was subject to multiple claims of corruption.
Members and aspiring members of Salah al-Din council clearly used the reconciliation 
file to garner political support. Immediately after ISIL’s defeat, the governor of Salah al- 
Din, Ahmed al-Jabouri (Abu Mazen) left the post to his cousin to become Minister of 
Provincial Affairs in Haider al-Abadi’s government. The latter position was abolished in 
2016 and, to garner support from Salah al-Din tribes and the Prime Minister’s Office to 
be reinstated as governor, Abu Mazen assumed a prominent role in mediation between 
tribes. On reinstatement, he spent large amounts of provincial funding on compensating 
victims of ISIL. Abu Mazen, who had already been investigated for corruption, was 
subsequently removed as governor in July 2017 and sentenced to prison for misusing 
authority and federal funds and appropriating lands for personal use. Undeterred, on his 
release, he successfully campaigned in the 2018 parliamentary elections, winning a seat 
after his electoral bloc won the highest number of votes in Salah al-Din, and his staying 
power in the province is undoubtedly partly attributable to his accommodation of Iran- 
sponsored PMFs in Salah al-Din.46
43In 2018, the National Office for Reconciliation was replaced by the Higher Committee for Community Coexistence and 
Peace.
44Human Rights Watch, 'Iraq: Displacement, Detention of Suspected “ISIS Families”', March 5, 2017, https://www.hrw.org/ 
news/2017/03/05/iraq-displacement-detention-suspected-isis-families (accessed May 23, 2021).
45Interview with NIF member, 6 January 2020.
46In July 2019, the US government sanctioned Abu Mazen for corruption, claiming that Abu Mazen ‘has been known to 
protect his personal interests by accommodating Iran-backed proxies that operate outside of state control.’ (‘Treasury 
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Meanwhile, AAH, which had been vying for popular support with Badr and Kata’ib 
Jund al-Imam Abbas, used its pivotal (if hardly ‘neutral’) role in the ‘mediation’ process 
to consolidate territorial control over the district.47 Conversations with actors on differ-
ent sides of the dispute suggest that even those who disliked and/or feared AAH believed 
that, as the most consistent force on the ground, it was best-placed to enforce agreements, 
largely thanks to the authority exercised by Abu Ali al-Saa’di, who forged effective 
working relationships with several tribal shaikhs, and, for instance, identified a Zubayd 
tribal shaikh in Dujail as AAH’s point of contact for ‘tribal affairs’.48 AAH collected funds 
from families who wished to return, redistributing them to victims’ families, and pressing 
the latter to accept the returnees. Families could not return without obtaining AAH’s 
approval. This practice appears to have paid dividends, as AAH’s political candidate, who 
stood in the 2018 elections on the PMF list (Fatah – which came second overall in the 
province), won the Balad seat based on electoral support from over 5,000 Sunni returnees 
to Yathrib.
Since consolidating its territorial control over Yathrib, AAH has reportedly retained 
an effective stranglehold over social and political life within the area in return for 
preserving stability and fighting resurgent ISIL cells (of which there have been 
a growing number since mid-2019). Several interviewees indicated that reconstruction 
contractors, humanitarian agencies, and other commercial operatives require approval 
from AAH to operate in the town, and some residents indicated that the group made 
money from taking a cut of royalties and profits.
The actual monetary cost of return remains obscure. Interlocuters in Salah al-Din told 
us that in 2016 the Sunni Endowments chairman offered to pay 2 billion dinars (approxi-
mately 1.8 million USD) as compensation to ISIL victims’ families; that the governor had 
used government funding allocated to Salah al-Din for reconstruction in areas damaged 
by Daesh to pay 300 million dinars (over 250,000 USD) as part of a deal in which 
displaced local clans agreed to pay 100 million dinars (around 84,000 USD) blood money; 
and that AAH collected 500,000 dinars (around 420 USD) from each returning family, 
which it paid to victims’ families. Another interlocuter indicated that AAH had taken 
a cut from the sums it collected. And news reports on the March 2019 reconciliation 
agreement indicated that only a third of the 700 million dinars (500,000 USD) in blood 
money ‘owed’ to the families of victims had been raised.
6. Conclusion: revisiting the international in local peacebuilding
The complexities of achieving reconciliation in Yathrib raise questions about the role that 
external agencies can or should play in subnational peace processes in Iraq, and, by 
extension, in other post-conflict states.
In the first instance, it bears remembering that relationships between international 
actors and subnational ‘local’ actors are heavily influenced by relationships between those 
same international actors and the federal government. The practice of offering capacity- 
building, training and funding for community leaders and organisations at the subnational 
Sanctions Persons Associated with Serious Human Rights Abuse and Corrupt Actors in Iraq’, US Treasury, July 2019. 
https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm735 (accessed May 20, 2020).
47Interview with NIF adviser, 5 February 2020.
48Interview with a member of the local peace committee for Balad and Dujail, 22 January 2020.
PEACEBUILDING 13
level to promote civic participation in post-conflict and ‘fragile’ states is now well recog-
nised. Nonetheless, as a rule, external actors only support subnational political capabilities 
that challenge the authority of federal government if their relationship with the centre has 
conclusively broken down. The UN 2015 Peacebuilding Review concedes that the UN is not 
in the best position to lead the process for sustaining peace but can only assist and facilitate 
national stakeholders in doing so.49 In Iraq’s case, the US and the ‘international commu-
nity’ more broadly (understood as Western liberal democracies, their allies and associated 
multilateral agencies) created the foundations of the federal Iraqi government after regime 
change, and as a result these actors have been deeply vested in its success. Notwithstanding 
increasing discomfort over the Iraqi government’s trajectory, there is little prospect of 
Western international actors forsaking national political processes. So, even where external 
actors have intervened into subnational peace processes, they have done so with the support 
of the National Office for Reconciliation and its successor office. Hence, there is little 
opportunity to bypass the centre in order to reach and empower ‘ordinary citizens’, except 
to the extent that key national partners can cut through bureaucracy.
Second, contrary to representations of ‘localism’ as inclusive, emancipatory, and 
romantic,50 subnational politics is often equally if not more exclusionary and transac-
tional than national politics. Where local governance is dominated by transactional 
politics, local peace processes are similarly likely to be so. That does not mean there is 
no will amongst ‘local’ citizens to produce a more equitable settlement, it simply means 
that overriding self-interested actors is extremely difficult. This is something that inter-
nationally funded projects designed to promote civic participation have to contend with 
often they are ill-equipped to compete with other ‘local’ actors who rely on force and on 
funding sources which are unconstrained by accountability mechanisms.51 The micro- 
political economy of peacebuilding is a key consideration. Several interviewees from 
Balad district contrasted the consistent presence of AAH in Yathrib with the more patchy 
role played by Sanad, which was forced to cease activities 6 months after it started when 
funding ran out, only to re-engage 18 months later. As a result, interlocutors questioned 
how they could consider Sanad or the UNDP as reliable local partners.
Third, in the Iraqi context at least, Sanad and the UNDP were faced with multiple 
political and security actors already involved in seeking solutions to displacement. In 
what is often a crowded subnational political marketplace, the process of identifying 
relevant stakeholders and community representatives is often complex and politicised. In 
fact, conversations with individuals from Balad suggest that many people who had not 
been directly engaged in the negotiations were unaware of the role that Sanad or the 
UNDP played in the reconciliation file. Their work was complicated by difficulties in 
establishing a common agenda not only amongst the disputing tribes but also amongst 
the various ‘mediating’ actors, or a solid line of communication with the Iraqi govern-
ment’s Reconstruction Fund administrators.
Fourth, the non-inclusive and often unequitable dimensions of subnational peace-
building processes in post-conflict settings such as Yathrib present ethical dilemmas to 
49United Nations General Assembly and Security council, ‘Challenge of sustaining peace: Report of the Advisory Group of 
Experts on the Review of the Peacebuilding Architecture,’ June 2015.
50Oliver Richmond, ‘De-romanticising the local, de-mystifying the international: hybridity in Timor Leste and the Solomon 
Islands,’ The Pacific Review 24, no. 1 (2011): 115–136.
51Such funding is not necessarily always domestic: the PMF are widely believed to receive Iranian funding.
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international actors regarding intervention. On the one hand, Sanad and the UNDP had 
to decide how to interact with the military factions including the Iran-backed PMFs on 
the ground. A member of the NIF acknowledged that Sanad was obliged to accept the 
reality that the PMF were the primary guarantors of security in the area, and that their 
buy-in was essential to achieve any kind of settlement, so Sanad took advantage of the 
competition between them, and in particular AAH, Badr and Kata'ib Jund al-Imam 
Abbas) to secure reconciliation settlements and thereby accrue political capital to com-
plement its own efforts to facilitate peace-talks. Similarly, when the UNDP supported the 
establishment of local peace committees, in keeping with UN operational guidelines, no 
PMFs or military personnel were enlisted, but since it was impossible to exclude the 
PMFs from mediation, Sanad coordinated indirectly with them via the National Office of 
Reconciliation and the National Security Advisory.52 On the other hand, USIP and Sanad 
decided to engage with tribal musalahat, something which most external development 
agencies have avoided, on the basis that they undermine civil law. Conversely, USIP has 
maintained that in many cases, obtaining buy-in from tribal leaders in negotiations has 
been simply the only way of restoring stability. Instead of trying to ignore tribal figures in 
the implementation of peace strategies, the objective should be to encourage them to 
support formal process of law and to forego the implementation of exclusionary elements 
of tribal law.53 Sanad and the USIP sought to establish bridges between national and local 
peace processes because, as the USIP programme manager argued, there need to be 
national level solutions that can consolidate local gains.54
Overall, our findings suggest that in order to assert themselves as relevant and effective 
partners, externally funded peacebuilding actors need to be able to recognise and 
manipulate the existing logic or ‘rules of the game’ that inform how business – including 
the business of peacebuilding – is done. This is particularly the case with respect to 
subnational peace processes, where they find themselves in the thick of multiple over-
lapping political fields. In the Iraqi case, the logic is tribal and transactional, and in 
Yathrib at least, Sanad did accept these parameters, even when seeking to modify them. 
Naturally, the kind of reconciliation agreements that Sanad helped to secure are not the 
end of the story: after returning home, residents face the much longer process of 
rebuilding their place in the community. The UNDP’s local peace committees were 
designed with this longer-term goal in mind, but their sustainability is questionable, 
and one committee member suggested to us that the committee’s success was more 
attributable to the fact that it contained members already active in brokering reconcilia-
tions, than to the fact that they had been organised into a committee.55
None of the caveats discussed necessarily negate the value of external actors promot-
ing peace at the subnational level. The efforts by USIP, Sanad and the UNDP to facilitate 
dialogue between disputing parties in Yathrib over the course of several years do appear 
to have been integral to achieving a number of agreements for return – even if few Iraqis 
are aware of them. In their absence, the process would likely have been more exclusionary 
52Interview with member of the NIF, 7 January 2020.
53Interview with USIP programme manager, 8 December 2019.
54Osama Gharizi & Haidar al-Ibrahimi, ‘Baghdad must seize the chance to work with Iraq’s tribes’, USIP, January 17, 2018. 
https://warontherocks.com/2018/01/baghdad-must-seize-chance-work-iraqs-tribes/ (accessed February 22, 2020), and 
authors’ interview with USIP programme manager, 8 December 2019.
55see note 48 above.
PEACEBUILDING 15
and corrupt. These limited gains may, indeed, be considered a positive outcome in view 
of the overriding Iraqi political status quo. But in the final assessment, there is nothing 
romantic about local peacebuilding in Iraq.
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